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Understating the Rise of the Regulatory State in the Global South
Over the last ten to fifteen years, a broad acceptance of the rise of the "regulatory state" around the world has emerged. In a nice turn of phrase, Michael Moran once asked if the regulatory state is simply an "intellectual brazier" around which diverse scholars can gather. Although one interpretation of this is that the term lacks a precise definition, it also conveys the stimulation and dialogue that can be generated by focusing on the regulatory state. This paper aims to provide a framework for a forthcoming project that is based on just such a dialogue. The project will bring together 12-15 scholars whose work focuses on the regulatory state in the so-called 'developing world' to try and understand better the rise of the regulatory state in the Global South. In this framing paper, we deliberately aim to integrate a range of diverse perspectives, organised in three broad sections. If there is a common argument to this framing paper, it rests on two broad theses. First, that in order to understand the rise of the regulatory state in the Global South, it is critical to integrate politics into not just an appreciation of micro-level case study dynamics, but also into our broader theoretical approaches. Secondly, this deep integration of politics into an understanding of the regulatory state departs from the more technocratic approaches of 'mainstream' literature on the regulatory state to suggest that the project of 'depoliticization' through regulation is not only near impossible, but also ignorant of core features of developing country regulatory states.
1 To put it differently, it may not always be possible to draw a line between 'regulating' and 'governing', which then requires reclassifying core features of developing country regulatory states, shifting them from 'problems' to be corrected to essential context to be internalized in the regulatory process.
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What then, do we take as the core of the regulatory state in this project? Its empirical manifestations include at a minimum the emergence of law-backed specialised agencies, often assumed to operate through administrative means to support the unitary goal of economic efficiency. More generally, the notion of the regulatory state connotes greater reliance on institutions operating at arms-length from government, insulated from daily political pressures and embedding their decisions in technical expertise. In Nicola Phillips' words: 'the emergence of the regulatory state refers to a process by which economic management has become 'proceduralised': it is characterised by an increasingly rule-based, technocratic and juridical approach to Although these 'big questions' could be asked in relation to any specific empirical context, relatively little work has explored whether, and how, the rise of the regulatory state in the Global South, and its implications for processes of governance, are distinct from cases in the North. The oft-noted features in the South of weak state capacity, constrained resources and powerful external pressures to adopt particular policy transplants might reasonably converge to produce a distinctive trajectory.
Whether or not such a distinctive trajectory is in fact emerging is often obscured in the policy literature by the concurrent normative impulse to 'correct' these contextual features in the service of the 'best-practice' model being imported. We argue that the task of understanding through empirical research is an important prior undertaking that needs to be separated from normative prescription. In other words, deepening our macro-micro split identified as a feature of Levi-Faur's work: that is, the intertwined nature of politics and regulation is acknowledged at the case study level, yet is not deeply embedded at the macro-theoretical level.
In addition to these well known ideas, there is a growing literature on the regulatory experience and an emergent regulatory state emerging from within the Global South.
Much of this work, although empirically driven, blends descriptive-analytical mapping with normative evaluation. This emergent literature is also eclectic in its theoretical moorings, drawing variously from political sociology, Global
Administrative Law, and institutional economics. We suggest that it is helpful to begin identifying the specificity of the regulatory state in the Global South, to establish a productive dialogue between these different orientations to the spread of independent regulatory agencies to the South.
In order to do so, the workshop (and, mirroring that, this framing paper) proceeds in three sections. The first section explores the introduction of IRAs in infrastructure sectors such as electricity, water and telecommunications, highlighting functional delegation approaches to regulatory policy transfer and exploring their genesis, while at the same time interrogating and supplementing them. In the second section, we retain the focus on infrastructure sectors for the time being but move beyond a preoccupation with agencies at the institutional level, looking more broadly at other actors including courts, informal providers, and investors. In the final section, we detach our analysis from both infrastructure and IRAs to explore whether alternative theoretical starting points have the potential to capture the distinctiveness of regulatory state development in the Global South. Potential theoretical approaches include perspectives coming from recent adaptations of New Institutional Economics;
broader sociological accounts of regulatory capitalism; global administrative law;
international relations approaches to transnational governance; and perspectives from law and development especially on the developmental state.
The Spread of the Regulatory State: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Infrastructure Sectors
The rise of the regulatory state is typified by the spread of the regulatory agencies that constitute its archetypal institutional form. This project includes a range of case studies of this phenomenon, drawing from multiple geographic regions and infrastructure sectors. The case studies are not structured so as to form a basis for systematic cross-country or cross-sectoral comparison: instead, we hope to inductively identify from these case studies key elements of the regulatory experience in the South, building particularly upon two broad lines of questioning linked loosely to different levels of governance.
First, to what extent and how is the regulatory state of the South shaped by the interface between the domestic and the international, especially in relation to external agencies and multinational corporations? Pressures from external agencies, such as multilateral development banks, to establish regulatory agencies are oft-noted aspects of institutional history in developing countries, yet rarely explored in detail. Ahmed
Badran's paper, for example, uses a detailed examination of the genesis of Egypt's telecommunications regulatory agency to point out that to explain delegation to an independent agency in terms of insulation against political uncertainty, as Moe (1990) does in the context of the North, depends upon assumptions of sovereign autonomy in the economic policy-making zone that is in practice severely constrained by external In addition to infirmities of the state, the simple fact of greater and widespread poverty in developing countries can affect the nature of the regulatory task by increasing the challenge of spreading the costs of regulatory reform. For example, the oft-repeated principle of cost recovery espoused by multilateral agencies carries far greater political and welfare implications in poorer nations where increasing costs can, in practice, mean exclusion from basic services.
Although it is useful heuristically to structure our enquiry by reference to 'international' and 'national' sources of influence, we would also argue that important features driving the spread of independent regulatory agencies subsist in a transnational space that is neither clearly international nor domestic (see also 
Mapping Regulatory Spaces: Practice and Politics
Possibly one of the clearest lessons emerging from attempts at North-South regulatory transplant is the ambiguity of the label 'independent' as a descriptor of a regulatory agency. This ambiguity arises in significant measure from the fact that regulatory agencies operate at the intersection of both political and private sector influences.
Either or both of these very different sources of influence can be characterised as undermining independence, with different normative import depending not only on the specific context but also on the pre-commitments of those writing about or shaping the regulatory regime. Tony Prosser (2010) argues that two different visions of regulation contest for space in regulatory debates -one emphasising regulation as an infringement of autonomy and one stressing its collaborative nature -which suggests alternative pre-commitments would lead to very different evaluations of 'independence'. But even given a shared prior vision of regulation, the persistent hybridity of contemporary forms and contexts of regulatory transplant is arguably even more distinctively present in the South than in the North, given the influence of consultants on regulatory design, the fact that regulation is more often imposed on state-owned operators than on private enterprise, or the frequency of contracting-out to complex public-private partnerships. All this combines to suggest intractable limits to the concept of 'independence' as an organising principle.
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Given this, the second move in our consideration of the specificity of the regulatory state in the South starts with the premise that the regulatory agency may not be a necessary or even useful place to start in understanding a regulatory context. Papers in this section will explore and map regulatory problems from a range of different starting points.
To begin with, the literature on 'weak institutional environments' discussed in the He elaborates in ways that bring democratic theory to the forefront of the analysis:
If we believe that democracy is fundamentally an attribute of states, when we live in …. a state with limited effective capacity to govern, we are disabled from building democracy…and waste our breath demanding state responses that it does not have the capacity to provide. But when our vision of democracy is messy -of circles of deliberative circles, there are many kinds of circles we can join that…actually matter in building democracy. The proceduralisation of decisionmaking introduced by the creation of regulatory agencies is often an important facilitator of broader political mobilization, in ways quite unanticipated by designers intent on providing safeguards to investors. Indeed, regulatory institutions can occasionally be the beachhead for formalization of administrative law traditions, where these previously were ad hoc, as in India.
Provisions ensuring transparency are a precondition for regulatory dialogue, while hearings and requirements for reasoning and redress provide and amplify voice.
Indeed, returning to Prosser's contending visions of regulation, while procedural safeguards are useful for the preservation of autonomy view of regulation, they are essential for regulation understood as collaboration. In the limit, as Prosser (1999) has suggested, regulation tends toward "government in miniature" bringing the study of regulation directly into conversation with larger questions of governance.
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Toward Understanding a Regulatory State of the
South: Broadening the Conversation
The final section of this framing paper returns to the big questions of how to govern, given weak institutional capacity, distinctively large challenges of inequality and poverty, and the pathologies of command and patrimonial clientilism. As a basis for forging a common ground for a broad discussion of larger governing questions such as these, we are including in this section attempts to theorise the regulatory state drawing on a variety of other literatures that approach similar questions from different perspectives. Four such potential bodies are briefly discussed here. A possible common theme uniting them is they all increasingly centre on "partnership" stories that cross state-market-civil society lines, taking the centrality of politics as an important starting point for exploring the appropriate institutional structuring for those partnerships. Levi-Faur (2009:184) 'invests in rule making, monitoring and enforcement at the expense of other types of policy including service provision, subsidies and, more generally, redistribution'.
Stated as such, the focus of this lens overlaps considerably with that of the literature on global administrative law. In contrast to varieties of capitalism, however, global administrative law is more firmly focused on transnational rather than national regulatory spaces, albeit with explicit accommodation for national agencies acting as "distributed administration" with reference to global administrative law, and on an implicitly normative and prescriptive agenda highlighting transparency and accountability rather than interpretive or explanatory accounts of geographical variation.
While all these bodies of work can illuminate the distinctiveness of the Global South as a generalised category, the common theme noted at the start of this section -that is, a theme of increasingly complex hybrid partnerships that cross state-market-civil society lines -reminds us that it is equally important to acknowledge the limits to the increased differentiation within the South and from increased economic integration between North and South. The first of these, increased differentiation within the South, is capable of being dealt with up to a point within the confines of the theoretical lenses so far alluded to. As noted above, the varieties of capitalism lens explicitly lends itself to this, but so too does the institutional turn advocated by Peter
Evans' exploration of the developmental state -as shown, for example, by Ladawn
Haglund's work disaggregating the notion of 'embeddedness' into a typology of developing country states' capacity to foster broad citizenship by the production of public goods (Haglund 2010 ).
The second limit on assumptions of a North/South divide -increased economic integration between North and South -is analytically much more challenging to engage with. It produces complex dynamics: for example, Mikler (2008) Regulation is yet another potential locus. The sources are many; the terrain is fertile:
the overarching question which we hope to provoke is whether and how regulatory theory can provide a basis for engaging the particular puzzles of regulation in the Global South, the ways in which this engagement can integrate politics at both micro and macro levels, and in doing so, shed light on the larger challenges of governing in ways that may well reorient our understanding of the regulatory state in the North as well as in the South.
